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This paper introduces a bivariate version of the generalized accelerated failure
time model. It allows for simultaneity in the econometric sense that the two re-
alized outcomes depend structurally on each other. Another feature of the pro-
posed model is that it will generate equal durations with positive probability. Our
approach takes a stylized economic model that leads to a univariate generalized
accelerated failure time model as a starting point. In this model, agents decide
when to transition from an initial state to a new one, and the covariates influence
the difference in the utility flow in the two states. We introduce simultaneity by
allowing the utility flow to depend on the status of the other person. The econo-
metric model is then completed by assuming that the observed outcome is the
Nash bargaining solution in that simple economic model. The advantage of this
approach is that it includes independent realizations from the generalized accel-
erated failure time model as a special case, and deviations from this special case
can be given an economic interpretation. We established identification under as-
sumptions that are similar to those in the literature on nonparametric estimation
of duration models. We illustrate the model by studying the joint retirement de-
cisions in married couples using the Health and Retirement Study. In that exam-
ple, it seems reasonable to allow for the possibility that each partner’s optimal
retirement time depends on the retirement time of the spouse. Moreover, the data
suggest that the wife and the husband retire at the same time for a nonnegligible
fraction of couples. The main empirical finding is that the simultaneity is econom-
ically important. In our preferred specification, the indirect utility associated with
being retired increases by approximately 5% when one’s spouse retires.
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1. Introduction and related literature
This paper introduces a new class of econometric duration models that allow for joint
determination of pairs of durations. This joint determination can manifest itself not only
in correlation between the durations, but also in a nonzero probability that they are
equal, despite their marginal distributions being continuous. The class has the gener-
alized accelerated failure time model as a special case.
One easy way to introduce correlation in two durations is to allow for correlation
in unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, it would be easy to allow for concurrent exits
due to common shocks in the spirit of Marshall and Olkin (1967). In contrast to this,
the aim of this paper is to introduce a model in which the dependence is generated
endogenously. This is in many ways similar to introducing the correlation in a pair of
linear regressions through simultaneity as opposed to through correlation in the errors.
Our approach is to think about an individual in a pair making a transition into a
new state, where the utility in the new state depends on whether the other individual
in the pair is in that state. These utility externalities are in the spirit of de Paula (2009)
and Honoré and de Paula (2010). Those papers assume an environment where a non-
cooperative model is natural. However, when the utility externality is positive and the
individuals can communicate, it may be more reasonable to model the observed tran-
sition times as the outcomes of a Nash bargaining problem. In Section 2 of this paper,
we set up a stylized model that has this flavor. The Nash solution corresponds to a set
of behavioral axioms on the bargaining outcomes (essentially Pareto efficiency, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and symmetry). It is widely adopted in the literature
on intra-household bargaining, and it can be generalized to more than two individuals.
In setting up the model, we will make a number of admittedly restrictive assumptions.
Those assumptions are all driven by the goal of keeping standard econometric duration
models as special cases of our model.
Simultaneity and correlated timing issues appear in various social and economic
phenomena. The timing of joint migration among related individuals (Orrenius (1999)
and Bijwaard and Schluter (2016)), desertion in a military company (Costa and Kahn
(2003), de Paula (2009)), the timing of social program participation (Moffitt (1983)) or
the signing of international treaties (Wagner (2016)) are examples of this. In this paper,
we use joint retirement decisions within married couples to illustrate our econometric
model. A majority of retirees are married and many studies indicate that a significant
proportion of individuals retire within a year of their spouse. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. The spike in the distribution of the difference in retirement dates for husbands
and wives in Figure 1 suggests that many couples retire simultaneously. This is consis-
tent with the observation that 55% of respondents in the Health and Retirement Study
expected to retire at the same time as their spouses.1 There are at least two explanations
1The figure corresponds to those who answer either YES to the question: “Do you expect your spouse to
retire at about the same time that you do?” (R1RETSWP). It excludes those whose spouse was not working.
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Figure 1. Difference in Retirement Months (Husband–Wife).
for such a phenomenon. One is that the husband and wife expect to receive correlated
shocks (observable or not), driving them to retirement at similar times. This is similar
to a Marshall and Olkin (1967) model, and it is the approach used by An, Christensen,
and Gupta (2004) to analyze joint retirement in Denmark. The other explanation is that
retirement is jointly decided, reflecting the taste interactions of both members of the
couple. In our illustration, we focus on the second of these explanations because it is
this mechanism that corresponds to our methodological contribution.
The distinction between the two drivers of concurrent exists (which are not mutually
exclusive) is similar to the motivation for studying linear simultaneous equation models,
and it parallels the categorization by Manski (1993) (see also de Paula (2017)) of corre-
lated and endogenous (direct) effects in social interactions. In those literatures, the joint
determination of the outcomes of interest yi for individuals i= 12 is represented by the
system of equations
y1 = α1y2 + x′1β1 + ε1
y2 = α2y1 + x′2β2 + ε2
where xi and εi, i = 12 represent observed and unobserved covariates determining yi.
We want to separate the endogenous (direct) effect (the α’s) from the correlation in the
ε’s. Discerning these two sources of correlation in outcomes is relevant for analytical
and policy reasons. For example, when the estimated model does not allow for joint
decision-making within the couple, the estimate of the effect of a retirement-inducing
policy shock can be misleading if the retirement dates are indeed chosen jointly. The
spillover effects that result from joint decisions invalidate, for instance, the commonly
employed Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption used in the treatment effects liter-
ature. This prevents a clear separation of the direct effects and the indirect effects that
occur through feedback to the partner’s retirement decision (e.g., Burtless (1990)). Fur-
thermore, the multiplier effect induced by the effect of one person’s retirement on the
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spouse is a potentially important conduit for policy. The quantification of its relative
importance is therefore paramount for both methodological and substantive reasons.
Our econometric model is a variation of a recently developed model (Honoré and
de Paula (2010)) that extends well-known duration models to a (noncooperative) strate-
gic stopping game, in which endogenous and correlated effects can be disentangled and
interpreted (see also de Paula (2009) for a related analysis). However, our model extends
simultaneous duration models differently from Honoré and de Paula (2010): whereas
that paper suggests a noncooperative game theoretic framework, the use of a cooper-
ative framework is much more appealing for applications where the utility-externality
is positive and where individuals can cooperate. Like the framework in Honoré and
de Paula (2010), the model proposed here directly corresponds to an economic model of
decision-making, and it can consequently be more easily interpreted in light of such a
model. To estimate our model, we resort to indirect inference (Smith (1993), Gourieroux,
Monfort, and Renault (1993), and Gallant and Tauchen (1996)), using as auxiliary models
standard duration models and ordered discrete choice models, as suggested in Honoré
and de Paula (2010) for a similar framework.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general
model and established identification under assumptions that are common in the lit-
erature on nonparametric estimation of duration models. Section 3 discussed a strat-
egy for parameterizing and estimating the model. This discussion is in the context of
joint retirement, but most of the considerations are relevant more broadly. Section 3
also presents the estimation results. We conclude in Section 4.
2. Model and empirical strategy
2.1 Basic setup
In this section, we formulate a simple econometric framework that allows a pair of dura-
tions with continuous marginal distributions to be interdependent and equal with posi-
tive probability. To simplify the exposition, we discuss the model in the context of retire-
ment decisions within a household, but it can be applied to any context in which the exit
times from an initial state to the destination state are chosen optimally, and in which it
may be optimal that the exit times are coordinated. It can also be generalized to more
than two agents. Our strategy is to model this in the spirit of a discrete choice model
in which the individual compares the utility in the two states. The interdependence is
driven by the possibility that the utility flow in the destination state depends on whether
the other person is already in the state. In the case of retirement decisions, this captures
the idea that spouses will want to decide jointly when to retire, and that the optimal de-
cision can be to retire at the same time if the utility flow from retirement depends on the
retirement status of the spouse. As is usual in choice models, the choice of the transition
times depends only on the difference in the discounted future utilities between being
in the initial state and being in the new state. The levels of the utilities do not matter.
This implies that many of the seemingly arbitrary assumptions made below are mere
normalizations with no behavioral implications. The resulting econometric model is ex-
plicitly designed to have the generalized accelerated failure model as a special case. In
this sense, it is a true generalization of a standard econometric model.
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In our model, a pair of individuals i and j each choose when to transition from an
initial state (in the illustration, working) to a destination state (retirement). i and j will
take values 1 and 2. Individual i with observable characteristics, xi, receives a utility flow
of Ki > 0 in the initial state (in the example, working). In the destination state, the utility
flow at time s is given by the deterministic function, Hi(sxi)D(s tj) where tj is the time
at which j transitions. The function D(s tj) is defined as (δ − 1)1(s ≥ tj) + 1 with δ ≥ 1
and it captures the idea that there can be complementarities in the transition decisions;
the utility for i in the destination state is higher once j has made the transition. In the
example, the utility of being retired is higher if the spouse is also retired. The comple-
mentarities implied by D(s tj) can be ascribed either to taste or to institutional features.
In the retirement example, these include tax or Social Security rules that may promote
coordination in retirement timing between husband and wife. Whereas this parameter
would not be invariant to changes in such regulations, it may be taken as fixed with
respect to other counterfactuals. The parameter δ could in principle be less than one.
However, this would not generate a positive probability that the individuals retire at the
same time (as observed in the data). In the calculations and exposition below, we there-
fore restrict our attention to the case where δ is greater than or equal to 1. δ could be
made spouse-specific as well, but for simplicity we focus on homogeneous δ.
The function Hi(sxi) is assumed to be increasing in s. This is because we are inter-
ested in a single spell econometric model in which each individual makes one transi-
tion. In the example, this makes retirement an absorbing state. In the general discussion
below, the key feature of Hi(sxi) is that its path is known at the time when the tran-
sition decision is made and that it is increasing. In the empirical application, we will
assume that it is separable, but this is not necessary. Moreover, the covariates can be
time-varying, in which case xi denotes the time-path of the explanatory variable, and
Hi(sxi(s)) is then assumed to be increasing.
As mentioned above, only the difference in utilities matters. This means that in the
retirement example, the monotonicity assumption implies that retirement becomes rel-
atively more attractive over time. The multiplicative structure for Hi(sxi)D(s tj) is im-
posed because we want the resulting model to have the same structure as the famil-
iar proportional hazard model. Except for this, the functional form for the utility flow
could easily be relaxed. In principle, it is possible to allow for kinks or discontinuities in
Hi(·xi). In a model without interdependence, those would correspond to discontinu-
ities in the hazard rate in the case of kinks in Hi(·xi) or, in the case of discontinuities in
Hi(·xi), positive probability of retirement at the discontinuity date.
The vector (K1K2) is the source of randomness in our econometric model. It is
drawn from some distribution and its elements are potentially correlated due to, for ex-
ample, sorting or other commonalities. It is observed to the agents in the model, but
unobserved to the econometrician. As such, it plays the same role as the error in the
random utility motivation of the multinomial logit model.
With this setup, the discounted utility for individual i, who transitions to the desti-
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where tj is the time at which the other agent, j, transitions, and (k1k2) is the realiza-
tion of (K1K2). We implicitly assume that the discount rate ρ and the function H are
such that the expression above is well-defined and finite. This structure is essentially the
same as in Honoré and de Paula (2010). There, it is assumed that the observed outcome,
(T1T2), is a Nash equilibrium. That assumption is in the spirit of much of the recent
work in industrial organization, but it seems inappropriate when the utility external-
ity is positive. Given a realization (k1k2) for the random vector (K1K2), we therefore
assume that the outcome is obtained as the Nash solution to the bargaining problem























where A1 and A2 are the threat points for spouses 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that
for all tj , Ai is less than the maximum utility for individual i. For instance, in the es-
timation, we set Ai equal to a fraction of the maximum utility individual i would ob-
tain without the increased utility from the externality from the spouse’s retirement. This
specification of the threat points makes economic sense, and it also saves us from hav-
ing to deal with the possibility that there are parameter values for which the factors in
(1) cannot be made positive. This means that the breakpoints depend on covariates. In a
more general setting, there may be asymmetric bargaining weights that appear as expo-
nents in the objective function. Our analysis could be generalized to include that case,
but we ignore this for simplicity and because it is difficult to think about nonparametric
features of the data that would allow us to reliably identify such an asymmetry.
The Nash bargaining solution concept is widely used in economics (see, e.g.,
Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2012)). It can be derived from a set of behavioral
axioms on the bargaining outcomes (essentially Pareto efficiency, independence of ir-
relevant alternatives, and symmetry) and it is widely adopted in the literature on intra-
household bargaining. While it does not pin down a particular negotiation protocol be-
tween the parties involved, it can be motivated by the observation that it approximates
the equilibrium outcome of a situation where the two agents make offers to each other in
an alternating order and the negotiation breaks down with a certain probability. As this
probability goes to zero, the equilibrium converges to the Nash solution (see Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986)).
One alternative to the Nash bargaining framework used here would be a utilitarian
aggregation of the utility functions in the group (i.e., the collective model of Chiappori
(1992)). In that case, the chose dates, (T1T2), would solve maxt1t2 cU
1(t1 t2;x1K1) +
U2(t2 t1;x2K2), where c stands for the relative weight of agent 1’s utility. This leads to







= 0 i= 12	
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The setting we propose focuses instead on maximizing (U1(t1 t2;x1K1) − A1) ×









= 0 i= 12	





As a result, parameterizing the Nash bargaining approach will impose implicit con-
straints on c in the corresponding collective model. By the same token, parameteriz-
ing the collective model will impose constraints on the corresponding Nash bargain-
ing model. See also Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2012). That paper also estab-
lishes identification results when a common set of covariates x affects both the threat
points Ai, i= 12, and utilities Ui, i= 12. Point-identification is achieved using spouse-
specific covariates that affect the threat points Ai, i = 12, but are excluded from Ui,
i = 12. In our empirical investigation, we rely instead on spouse-specific covariates in
Ui, i= 12, and no excluded variables in the threat point functions Ai, i= 12. Moreover,
Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2012) assume that latent variables (i.e., ki, i= 12) are
additively separable, which is not our case.
In order to estimate a parameterized version of the Nash bargaining model, we will
need to solve it numerically many times. Note that the first term in (1) can be further
simplified to(
K1ρ




−ρs ds and hence H˜ ′i(txi)= −Hi(txi)e−ρt . When the co-
variates are time-varying, H˜ ′i(txi) denotes the total derivative of H˜i(txi). An analogous





−1(1− e−ρt1)+ H˜1(t1xi)+ (δ− 1)H˜1(max{t1 t2}x1)−A1)
× (K2ρ−1(1− e−ρt2)+ H˜2(t2x2)+ (δ− 1)H˜2(max{t1 t2}x2)−A2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡II
	
If the two agents switch states sequentially, say, T1 < T2, the first-order condition














This implies that either
K1 =H1(T1x1)









The second possibility is ruled out since we specify the threat points so that each person
gets a higher utility than his or her threat point at the Nash bargaining solution. The
first-order condition with respect to t2 gives
H1(t2x1)e
−ρt2(1− δ)× (II)+ (I)× (K2e−ρt2 −H2(t2x2)δe−ρt2)= 0	 (2)
The t2 that solves this equation is smaller than the value obtained in Honoré and
de Paula (2010): H−12 (K2/δx2). In the example, the reason is that with Nash bargain-
ing, the second spouse to retire is willing to forgo some utility if the increase in util-
ity to the other spouse is sufficiently high. Mathematically, we see this by noting that
H1(t2x1)e−ρt2 > 0, and 1− δ < 0. Moreover, II must be positive in equilibrium. This im-
plies that H1(t2x1)e−ρt2(1− δ)× (II)≤ 0 at the solution. So for the first-order condition
to be zero, the product (I)× (K2e−ρt2 −H2(t2x2)δe−ρt2) should be positive. Since I and
e−ρt2 are both positive, K2 therefore must be greater than H2(t2x2)δ. Or equivalently,
T2 <H
−1
2 (K2/δx2). This implies that
T1 = H−11 (K1x1)
T2 ≤ H−12 (K2/δx2)
which gives the same timing choice for the first agent to switch as in Honoré and
de Paula (2010) but an earlier one for the other agent. A similar set of calculations is
obtained for T2 < T1.2








−1(1− e−ρt)+ δH˜1(tx1)−A1)(K2ρ−1(1− e−ρt)+ δH˜2(tx2)−A2)	







+ e−ρt(K1ρ−1(1− e−ρt)+ δH˜1(tx1)−A1)(K2 − δH2(tx2))	
When t <H−11 (K1/δx1) and t < H
−1
2 (K2/δx2), this derivative is positive, and when t >
H−11 (K1/δx1) and t > H
−1
2 (K2/δx2), it is negative. The optimum is therefore in the
2For computation purposes, we also notice that the objective function is unimodal on t2. If we start at
the critical value, increasing t2 reduces the function. This is because, for small ρ, H1(t2x1)e−ρt2(1− δ) be-
comes more negative and II becomes more positive, so the product becomes more negative. For the second
term, I decreases and k2e−ρt2 −H2(t2x2)δe−ρt2 , which is positive, decreases. Their product then decreases.
Consequently, the derivative, which is the sum of these two products, becomes negative, and the objec-
tive function is decreasing. Analogously, we can also determine that the objective function is increasing for
values below the critical value.
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}≤ t ≤max{H−11 (K1/δx1)H−12 (K2/δx2)}	
This is useful in the numerical calculation of the optimal solution in the empirical ex-
ample.
Figure 2 illustrates these cases and plots the optimal transition times, T1 and T2, as
a function of K2 as K1 is held fixed. For low values of K2, T1 > T2: in the retirement
example, labor force attachment is higher for spouse 1 than for spouse 2. When K1 is
large, on the other hand, T1 < T2 and spouse 1 retires sooner. For intermediary values
of K1, T1 = T2 and the two spouses retire at the same time. This generates probability
distributions such as those in Figure 3. Unconditionally, the probability density function
for T1 is smooth. Conditionally on T2 = t2, though, a point mass at T1 = t2 arises.
The set of realizations of (K1K2) for which T1 = T2 is the solution is larger than
the set obtained in the noncooperative setup from Honoré and de Paula (2010). This is
illustrated in Figure 4, where the area between the dotted lines is the joint transitions
region in Honoré and de Paula (2010) and the area between solid lines is the joint transi-
tion region in the current paper. Also, in that paper any date within a range [T < T ] was
sustained as an equilibrium for pairs (K1K2) inducing joint transition. In contrast, the
equilibrium joint transition date for a given realization of (K1K2) is uniquely pinned
down in the setup here. Because Nash bargaining implies Pareto efficiency and because
T is the Pareto dominant outcome among the possible multiple equilibria in the game
analyzed by Honoré and de Paula (2010), joint transition in the Nash bargaining model
occurs before T . In comparison to the noncooperative paradigm adopted in our pre-
vious paper, Nash bargaining allows agents to “negotiate” an earlier switching times,
which is advantageous to the pair.
Finally, we note that when Hi(txi) = Zi(t)ϕi(xi) and δ = 1, the optimal switching
times will correspond to
logZi(Ti)= − logϕi + logKi i= 12	
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Figure 3. Marginal density for T1 (solid line) and conditional given T2 = 45 (dotted line) and
T2 = 75 (dashed line).
Ki following a unit exponential distribution gives a proportional hazard model. For a
general distribution of Ki, this yields the generalized accelerated failure time model of
Ridder (1990). This is the sense in which the approach discussed in this section can be
Figure 4. Joint transition region. This paper (solid line) and Honoré and de Paula (2010)
(dashed line).
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thought of as a simultaneous equations version of a generalized accelerated failure time
model.
2.2 Identification
It can be difficult to understand what features of the data identify the parameters of
nonlinear econometric models. Within the duration literature, this has led to a sizeable
number of papers dealing with nonparametric identification.3 This literature is useful
in shedding light on the relation between the parameters of the model and the underly-
ing data. In this section, we establish that the model outlined above is identified under
assumptions similar to those used in the larger identification literature. Specifically, we
assume that Hi(txi) = Zi(t)ϕi(xi) so that a generalized accelerated failure time model
obtains when δ= 1 (see above). The main limitation is that we assume that the discount
rate ρ is known. This assumption is also made in many other articles on dynamic mod-
els.4
The logic behind the identification is that “identification” at infinity arguments
like those in Heckman and Honoré (1989) deliver identification of Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the
marginal distribution of Ki. The probability that T1 = T2 is then driven by the interac-
tion parameter δ. When δ= 1, there are no complementarities and T1 = T2 happens with
zero probability. Larger values of δ will induce larger complementarities, which should
make T1 = T2 more likely. Moreover, when the exits are sequential, the first person to
leave always does so at Z−1i (Ki/ϕi) irrespective of δ, while larger values of δ will lead to
earlier exits for the second person. This provides additional variation which can be used
to identify δ.
Theorem 1. Consider the model defined in Section 2.1 with Hi(txi) = Zi(t)ϕi(xi) and
with the discount rate ρ is known. Assume that:
1. The support of (ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) is R2+;
2. Zi : [0∞)→R, Zi(0)= 0, Zi(∞)= ∞ and Zi(·) is left-continuous and nondecreas-
ing; and
3. the threat points are given by a known fraction of the maximum utility obtainable
by each individual in the absence of externalities.
Then Z1(·), Z2(·), ϕ1(·), ϕ2(·), δ and the joint distribution of (K1K2) are identified (up
to scale normalizations) from the conditional distribution of (T1T2) given (x1x2).
Proof. We first note that the functions Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the marginal distribution for Ki
are formally identified (up to scale). This follows from the fact that ϕj(xj) (j = i) can be
3Examples include Elbers and Ridder (1982), Heckman and Honoré (1989), Ridder (1990), Honoré (1993),
Abbring and van den Berg (2003), and Honoré and de Paula (2010).
4See, for example, Rust (1987), Rust and Phelan (1997), and other papers in the dynamic discrete choice
literature.
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made arbitrarily close to zero. For such an individual, it is optimal to have tj = ∞. The
other person will then optimally choose Ti such that
logZi(Ti)= − logϕi(xi)+ logKi	
Identification of Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the marginal distribution for Ki (up to scale) then fol-
lows from Theorem 1 of Ridder (1990).5
To identify δ, take a pair such that t1 < t2. Then, applying the implicit function theo-
































where (I) and (II) are defined as in equation (2). The terms in 3 can be signed:
∂I
∂δ
= ϕ1Z˜1(t2) > 0 ∂II
∂δ
= ϕ2Z˜2(t2) > 0
∂I
∂t2
= Z1(t2)e−ρt2ϕ1(1− δ) < 0 ∂II
∂t2
= k2e−ρt2 −Z2(t2)ϕ2δe−ρt2 > 0
∂2I
∂t2∂δ
= −Z1(t2)e−ρt2ϕ1 < 0 ∂
2II
∂t2∂δ
= −Z2(t2)ϕ2e−ρt2 < 0
∂2I
∂t22
= Z′1(t2)e−ρt2ϕ1(1− δ) < 0
∂2II
∂t22




−ρs ds. These are all straightforward except for ∂II∂t2 > 0, which
follows from the discussion after (2). The signs on the derivatives of I and II , and the fact
that I ≥ 0 and II ≥ 0, imply that the denominator in expression (3) is strictly negative.
To see that the numerator is also negative, we first investigate the terms ∂II∂δ × ∂I∂t2 and
∂I














































5We note also that this identification argument operates irrespective of asymmetries in the bargaining
power or the values of A1 and A2 (even if these also depend on the covariates as in our empirical illustra-
tion).
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The two remaining terms in the numerator are negative, which then implies that the nu-
merator is negative. Consequently, (3) is negative: larger values of δ lead to earlier exits
by the second agent (i.e., lower t2). If one then focuses on t1 → 0 (by taking ϕ1 → ∞),
(I) and, consequently, t2 will not depend on k1. Having identified Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the
marginal distribution of K2, this allows one to identify δ. If δ′ > δ′′, for instance, since
at each k2 t2(δ′) < t2(δ′′), the distribution of T2 under δ′′ will then (first-order stochas-
tically) dominate the distribution of T2 under δ′ and the two are observationally distin-
guishable.6
Finally, to understand why the joint distribution of K1 and K2 is identified, we use
that the threat points are given by a known fraction of the maximum utility obtainable
by each individual in the absence of externalities. Given ρ, this utility is identified from
the components identified so far (i.e., Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the marginal distribution of Ki).
Then consider a point (k1k2). If the joint support of covariates is large enough, then
for that point there is a pair (ϕ1ϕ2) that induces sequential exits in a neighborhood
of (k1k2). When there are sequential exits, the dates t1 and t2 are a one-to-one map-
ping from k1 and k2. For example, if t1 < t2, then t1 is equal to Z
−1
1 (k1/ϕ1) and t2 is also
uniquely determined. From the first-order conditions to the maximization problem, it is
clear that, given (t1 t2) (and k1 =Z1(t1)ϕ1), one can uniquely retrieve the corresponding
k2 (see footnote 2). Since we have a one-to-one mapping, the Jacobian method allows
one to obtain the joint density of (K1K2) from the joint distribution of (T1T2). In other
words, a different distribution of (K1K2) in the neighborhood of (k1k2) changes the
probability of (T1T2) given the covariates corresponding to the initial choice of (ϕ1ϕ2)
leading to sequential exits.7 
To obtain identification in our model, we require that supp(ϕ1ϕ2) = (0∞)2 (or,
more precisely, that we can drive them to 0 or infinity). From that, we can induce Ti
to zero or to infinity. As is apparent from the discussion above, the identification argu-
ments are analogous to the strategies used in other parts of the duration literature. In
fact, one may be tempted to view our model as a variation of a competing risks model,
where related arguments are traditionally employed to establish identification (see, e.g.,
Heckman and Honoré (1989)). This would be incorrect because in our model, some pairs
will have simultaneous exits earlier than the first exit in the corresponding competing
risks model. In competing risks models, one is able to identify the marginal features of
the one risk by using covariates that help drive the hazard rate for the other risks to zero.
One can then combine those to obtain identification of the joint distribution of the un-
derlying unobservables. Here, we also drive the hazard of one of the “risks” (the exit by
one of the individuals) to zero to retrieve the marginal features for the other “risk.” To
obtain identification of the joint distributions, we then rely on covariate variation that
6Even though we assume that δ is the same for both individuals, we note that our identification strat-
egy would still hold if those were different across individuals. We also note that the argument here holds
irrespective of the threat points.
7Because the Jacobian transformation in the mapping between the two joint densities does not factor, it
is interesting to note that even when K1 and K2 are independent, T1 and T2 are not (locally) independent
on the T1 = T2 region.)
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induces immediate realisation for one of the “risks” (i.e., immediate exit by one of the
individuals), which is not usually necessary (or possible) in traditional competing risks
models.
The first part of proof of Theorem 1 is based on the behavior of the density of the
smallest duration when the largest approaches infinity. This implies that the first part of
the identification result (identification of Zi(·), ϕi(·) and the marginal distribution for
Ki) holds in an extended model that allows for a Marshall and Olkin (1967)-type com-
mon shock that terminate the two durations at the same time, provided that this shock
has support on all of R+ and is independent of (K1K2).
3. Empirical illustration
In this section, we illustrate the use of the setup in Section 2 by considering the joint re-
tirement behavior in married couples. The broader literature on retirement is abundant,
and there are a number of papers focusing on retirement decisions in a multiperson
household. Hurd (1990) presents one of the early documentations of the joint retire-
ment phenomenon. Later papers confirming the phenomenon and further characteriz-
ing the correlates of joint retirement include Blau (1998), Michaud (2003), Coile (2004a),
and Banks, Blundell, and Casanova Rivas (2007). Gustman and Steinmeier (2000, 2004)
worked with a dynamic economic model in which the husband’s and wife’s preferences
are affected by their spouse’s actions, but the couple makes retirement decisions indi-
vidually.8 These papers focus on Nash equilibria to the joint retirement decision, that
is, each spouse’s retirement decision is optimal given the other spouse’s timing and vice
versa.9 More recently, Gustman and Steinmeier (2009) present a richer (nonunitary) eco-
nomic model with a solution concept that differs from a Nash equilibrium and is guar-
anteed to exist and be unique. Michaud and Vermeulen (2011) estimated a version of
the “collective” model introduced by Chiappori (1992) in which (static) labor force par-
ticipation decisions by husband and wife are repeatedly observed from a panel (i.e., the
Health and Retirement Study). Casanova Rivas (2010) suggested a detailed unitary dy-
namic economic model of joint retirement. Coile (2004b) presented statistical evidence
on health shocks and couples’ retirement decisions and Blau and Gilleskie (2006) pre-
sented an economic model that also focuses on health outcomes and couples’ retire-
ment decisions.
3.1 Parameterization
In the construction of an econometric model for multiple durations that start at differ-
ent times, one must decide whether to measure time in terms a common calendar time
8In the family economics terminology, their model is a nonunitary model in which people in the house-
hold make decisions individually. In unitary models, the household is viewed as a single decision-making
unit. A characterization of unitary and nonunitary models can be found in Browning, Chiappori, and Lech-
ene (2006).
9When more than one solution is possible, they select the Pareto dominant equilibrium, that is, for all
other equilibria at least one spouse would be worse off. If no equilibrium is Pareto dominant, the equilib-
rium where retirement by at least one household member happens earliest is assumed (see, e.g., Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000, pp. 515, 520)).
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or in terms of the individual durations. Since the motivation of this paper is that events
sometimes happen at the same time, it is more convenient to measure time in terms of
a common calendar time. In our empirical analysis, we measure time in terms of “fam-
ily age,” which is set to zero when the older partner in the couple reaches age 60. We
then keep track of the age of the other spouse by using the age difference between the
husband and the wife as a covariate. Alternatively, we could have worked with the indi-
viduals’ ages, but that would be more cumbersome as a person may enjoy utility from
being retired at the same time as his or her spouse, and not from being retired at the
same age. Throughout, we use i = 12 to denote the two spouses in a married couple. n
is used to index couples.
In the empirical application, we specify Hi(txi) as Zi(t)ϕi(x1), which yields the link
to the generalized accelerated failure time model. If we further parameterize Zi(t) as
Z(t;θ1i)= tθ1i and if δ= 1 then the model developed in the previous section will deliver
the simple Weibull regression model with integrated baseline hazards tθ1i for the two
durations as a special case whenKi ∼ exp(1). Our parameterization therefore takes those
as the point of departure.
The structure of the US Social Security system introduces incentives to retire at cer-
tain ages. This could be accounted for by introducing a time-varying dummy variable
as one of the explanatory variables or by allowing for jumps in Z. Since the other ex-
planatory variables in the application are time-invariant, we find it notationally more
convenient to incorporate discontinuities in Zi at the time (measured in family age) at
which the individual turns 62 and 65. One way to do this would be to augment Z as
Z
(
t; (αγ) τ)=Z1(t;α)+ γ1{t ≥ t1} + γ2{t ≥ t2}
where γ1γ2 ≥ 0 is a parameter to be estimated and t1, t2 are the times of the jumps at
62 and 65. In the empirical illustration, we choose a slightly different version in which




t; (αγ1γ2) t1 t2
)=Z1(t;α)+ ∑
k=12
Z2(t;γk tk)= tα + γ1F(t; t1)+ γ2F(t; t2)
where Z2(t;γ t)= γF(t; t) and
F(t; t)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for t < t
2(t − t)2 for t < t < t + 1/2
1− 2(t − 1− t)2 for t + 1/2< t < t + 1
1 for t + 1< t	
As discussed later, the dataset delivers durations rounded to a month. Our choice of F is
therefore observationally equivalent to the step function, 1{t ≥ t}, but the former makes
it easier to calculate Z−1 numerically. This parameterization also delivers convenient
expressions for Z˜. See the Appendix.
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To allow for positive correlation between the unobserved variables K1 and K2 (in-
duced, e.g., by sorting), we use a Clayton–Cuzick copula function (see Clayton and Cuz-










u−τ + v−τ − 1)−1/τ for τ > 0
uv for τ = 0	 (4)
When τ > 0, there is positive dependence between variables K1 and K2. Specifically,
Kendall’s rank correlation for the Clayton–Cuzick copula is equal to τ/(2 + τ) (see, e.g.,
Trivedi and Zimmer (2006)). This copula is commonly used to introduce dependence in
the duration literature. Finally, we take ϕi(xi)= exp(x′iθ2i). This implies that when δ= 1
and τ = 0, the durations follow simple independent Weibull proportional hazard mod-
els (Lancaster (1990, p. 44)). This is the sense in which our approach generalizes simple
standard econometric duration models.
Clayton and Cuzick (1985) motivated (4) as the unique copula with a certain con-
stant odds ratio. However, they also point out that it is consistent with a model in which
the dependence between the two durations is driven by common unobserved hetero-
geneity (with a specific distribution). It is therefore tempting to ask whether it is feasible
to introduce additional unobserved heterogeneity. While the identification result in Sec-
tion 2.2 suggests that this is in principle possible, there are two reasons why we do not
consider this possibility in our empirical application. The first is that our model includes
the mixed Weibull model as a special case; hence a nonparametric specification of the
heterogeneity distribution will make root-n consistent estimation of the model parame-
ters impossible (see Hahn (1994)). Since some of the parameters of the model are already
imprecisely estimated, this suggests that a flexible parametric specification of the het-
erogeneity distribution would not be fruitful. The second and related reason is that we
estimate our model using indirect inference. To estimate a model with unobserved het-
erogeneity, we would therefore have to specify an auxiliary model whose parameters are
informative about the heterogeneity distribution. As mentioned earlier, when δ = 1 the
optimal retirement dates will correspond to
logZi(Ti)= − logϕi + logKi i= 12	








where logKi is distributed according to minus an extreme value distribution. On the







+ vi i= 12	 (5)
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In other words, the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity would be identified
from deviations of the distribution of the error term in (5) from an extreme value distri-
bution. Given the heavy censoring (more than 50%; see Section 3), this does not seem
fruitful.
3.2 Estimation: Indirect inference
Because the likelihood function for the model developed in the previous section is not
easily computed in closed form, we resort to simulation-assisted methods. One poten-
tial strategy would be to use simulated maximum likelihood (SML), where one non-
parametrically estimates the conditional likelihood via kernel methods applied to sim-
ulations of T1 and T2 at particular parameter values and searches for the parameter
value that maximizes the (simulated) likelihood. We opt for a different strategy for two
main reasons. First, our likelihood displays some nonstandard features. For example,
the event {T1 = T2} has positive probability. Second, consistency of the SML estimator
requires a large number of simulations, which can be computationally expensive.
To estimate our model, we therefore employ an indirect inference strategy (see
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), Smith (1993), and Gallant and Tauchen
(1996)). Rather than estimating the maximum likelihood estimator for the true model
characterized by parameter θ, one estimates an approximate (auxiliary) model with
parameter β. Let n = 1 	 	 	 N index a sample of households (couples). For a par-
ticular value of the parameters of the structural model, θ, we generate R data sets
{(z1r(θ) z2r(θ) 	 	 	  zNr(θ))}Rr=1 from our structural model. Here, zir(θ) denotes the data
for observation i in the r’th data set. In practice, this is done by transforming uniform
random variables. These are then kept fixed as one varies θ. The parameter, θ, enters
through the transformation of these uniform random variables.




























over θ where Sa is the score for the auxiliary model. The weighting matrix W is a positive
definite matrix playing the usual role in terms of efficiency. The optimal W can be cal-
culated using the actual data (before estimating θ) and the asymptotic properties follow
from standard GMM arguments (see Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) for details). This
strategy is useful because we only estimate the auxiliary model once using the real data.
After that, we evaluate its first-order condition using simulated data from the structural
model for different values of θ.
The retirement times used in the empirical application are interval censored, that is,
grouped at the monthly level. When doing the indirect inference, we mimic this by eval-
uating (6) at interval censored simulated durations. Finally, the outcome variable in our
empirical analysis is censored. To use simulation-based inference, we must be able to
simulate data that have been censored by the same process. In practice, this means that
we must either model the censoring process parametrically or observe the censoring
times even for those observations that are uncensored in the data. As discussed below,
our application falls into the second category.
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3.3 Data
We estimate the model using eight waves of the Health and Retirement Study (every 2
years from 1992 to 2006) and keep households where at least one individual was 60 years
old or more. Retirement is observed at a monthly frequency. We use the retirement clas-
sification suggested by the Rand Corporation. This classifies a respondent as retired if
she/he is not working and not looking for work or there is any mention of retirement
through the employment status or the questions that ask the respondent whether he or
she considers him or herself to be retired. To avoid left-censoring, selected households
also had both partners in the labor force at the initial period. Right-censoring occurs
when someone dies or is not retired at his or her last interview before the end of the sur-
vey. We excluded individuals who were part of the military. Finally, we exclude house-
holds with multiple couples and individuals with multiple spouses during the period
of analysis, couples with conflicting information over marital status or other joint vari-
ables, and couples of the same gender. This leaves us with 1284 couples. Figure 5 plots
the retirement month of the husbands against the retirement month of the wives for
those couples whose retirement month is uncensored for both spouses (January 1931 is
month 1). The points along the 45-degree line are the joint retirements (approximately
7	6%).
We measure covariates in the first “household year,” that is, when the older partner
reaches the age of 60.10 The covariates we use are: (1) the age difference in the couple
(husband’s age minus wife’s age in years); (2) dummies for race (non-Hispanic black,
Hispanic, and other race with non-Hispanic whites as the omitted category); (3) dum-
mies for education (high school or GED, some college and college or above with less than
high school as the omitted category); (4) indicators of region (NE, SO, and WE with MW
Figure 5. Retirement months: husband versus wife.
10We take the measurements from the first interview after the older spouse turns 60.
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or other region as the omitted category); (5) self-reported health dummies (good health,
very good health, with poor health as the omitted category); (6) an indicator for whether
the person has any health insurance (private or public or through the spouse); (7) the
total health expenditure per individual in the previous 12 months for the first two waves
and the previous 2 years for the subsequent years (inflation adjusted using the CPI to
Jan/2000 dollars); (8) indicators for whether the person had a defined contribution (DC)
or defined benefit (DB) plan; and (9) financial wealth (inflation adjusted using the CPI
to Jan/2000 dollars).11 It does not include housing wealth or private pension holdings.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables we use. Note that we observe
potential censoring months even for the observations that are uncensored in the data.
This means that even though we assume that the censoring time is independent from re-
Table 1. Summary statistics.
All Observations Uncensored Censored
Variable Mean N Mean N Mean N
Gender 0	50 2568 0	56 1265 0	44 1303
Min(Ret. Month, Cens. Month) 52	67 2568 44	43 1265 60	66 1303
Censored 0	51 2568 0	00 1265 1	00 1303
Censoring Montha 85	04 2568 110	15 1265 60	66 1303
Age Diff. 4	11 2454 3	80 1234 4	43 1220
Non-Hisp. White 0	79 2568 0	82 1265 0	76 1303
Non-Hisp. Black 0	11 2568 0	09 1265 0	12 1303
Other Race 0	02 2568 0	02 1265 0	03 1303
Hispanic 0	08 2568 0	06 1265 0	10 1303
<High School 0	16 2568 0	18 1265 0	15 1303
HS or GED 0	36 2568 0	39 1265 0	34 1303
Some College 0	24 2568 0	22 1265 0	26 1303
College or Above 0	23 2568 0	21 1265 0	25 1303
NE 0	18 2568 0	18 1265 0	04 1303
MW 0	26 2568 0	26 1265 0	25 1303
SO 0	40 2568 0	37 1265 0	43 1303
WE 0	16 2568 0	17 1265 0	15 1303
Health Insurance 0	88 2554 0	89 1257 0	86 1297
Very Good Health 0	56 2568 0	57 1265 0	85 1296
Good Health 0	30 2568 0	30 1265 0	30 1303
Poor Health 0	14 2568 0	13 1265 0	14 1303
Pension (DB) 0	26 2568 0	30 1265 0	22 1303
Pension (DC) 0	24 2568 0	21 1265 0	27 1303
Tot. Health Expen.b 8	22 2180 9	48 1220 6	61 960
Financial Wealthb 81	22 2568 88	76 1265 73	90 1303
Note: a. For those uncensored, the censoring month is either the last interview or death date, whichever is the earlier date.
It is used in the simulations for indirect inference.
b. Inflation-adjusted using the CPI to thousands of 2000 US dollars.
11For total health expenditure and financial wealth, we use the transformation sgn(x)×√|x|. This trans-
formation is in the spirit of a logarithmic transformation of positive variables and implies that large quan-
tities have a decreasing effect. In the computations, we also divide the transformed variable by 102 for total
health expenditure and by 103 for financial wealth (to avoid overflow).
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tirement dates (conditional on the covariates), we do not need to model the distribution
of censoring times to simulate the model.
Intuitively, our identification strategy applies to this empirical illustration if the ex-
planatory variables take values that make one of the spouses strongly attached to the la-
bor force given his or her covariate values. In our data, for example, about 5% of the hus-
bands who do not have a defined benefit pension plan retire after more than 126 months
(10	5 years) since the oldest member of the household turned 60. Similarly, for the wives,
5% of those without a defined benefit pension plan retire more than 140 months (11	7
years) since the oldest member turned 60.
3.4 Results
We now present our estimation results. The discount rate ρ is set to 5% per year (i.e.,
0	004 per month) and the threat points are set at 0	6 times the utility level an individ-
ual would have obtained without the retirement externality. The number of simulations
is R = 10. Figure 6, which displays estimates for the marginal cumulative distribution
functions of husbands and wives, suggests that a kink might be present, more so for
men, around months twenty-four and sixty since turning 60. This corresponds to turn-
ing 62 and 65 years old. As discussed in Section 3.1, we accommodate this time-varying
variable by allowing Z to have jumps when the individual turns 62 and 65 years old.
Tables 2 and 3 present our estimates. The results are very robust across covariate
specifications. There is positive duration dependence: retirement is more likely as the
household ages. Age differences tend to increase the retirement hazard for men and de-
crease it for women. Since men are typically older and we count “family age” from the
Figure 6. Kaplan–Meier estimates: husband and wife.
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Table 2. WIVES’ simultaneous duration.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
δ 1	052 1	064 1	072 1	066 1	037 1	039 1	045
(0	039) (0	042) (0	045) (0	040) (0	028) (0	029) (0	031)
θ1 1	244 1	244 1	248 1	260 1	258 1	276 1	269
(0	054) (0	054) (0	059) (0	052) (0	055) (0	060) (0	057)
≥62 yrs old 10	640 13	446 13	849 12	255 9	956 10	706 9	992
(5	916) (5	694) (10	756) (7	180) (7	890) (7	053) (6	141)
≥65 yrs old 10	036 12	326 12	046 18	926 16	014 18	473 16	236
(11	555) (7	495) (11	102) (10	919) (10	625) (11	125) (9	127)
Constant −5	786 −5	790 −5	605 −5	931 −5	853 −6	040 −6	061
(0	225) (0	276) (0	320) (0	338) (0	351) (0	363) (0	351)
Age Diff. −0	074 −0	075 −0	076 −0	076 −0	080 −0	078 −0	079
(0	016) (0	016) (0	016) (0	016) (0	019) (0	017) (0	018)
Non-Hisp. Black −0	149 −0	164 −0	113 −0	096 −0	030 −0	038
(0	153) (0	157) (0	160) (0	169) (0	168) (0	171)
Other race −0	649 −0	644 −0	515 −0	686 −0	559 −0	578
(0	337) (0	344) (0	332) (0	361) (0	330) (0	323)
Hispanic −0	490 −0	522 −0	466 −0	435 −0	324 −0	367
(0	192) (0	192) (0	202) (0	206) (0	210) (0	207)
High school or GED 0	052 0	064 0	144 0	145 0	145 0	124
(0	158) (0	156) (0	164) (0	168) (0	163) (0	164)
Some college −0	131 −0	119 −0	153 −0	114 −0	154 −0	185
(0	169) (0	167) (0	174) (0	181) (0	177) (0	177)
College or above −0	052 −0	028 0	073 0	052 −0	048 −0	061
(0	189) (0	189) (0	194) (0	203) (0	201) (0	200)
NE 0	002 −0	021 0	043 −0	053 −0	089 −0	079
(0	146) (0	148) (0	156) (0	164) (0	156) (0	157)
SO 0	065 0	040 0	116 0	101 0	077 0	101
(0	115) (0	116) (0	118) (0	122) (0	119) (0	120)
WE 0	217 0	197 0	254 0	190 0	158 0	193
(0	145) (0	148) (0	153) (0	155) (0	158) (0	156)
V Good Health −0	219 −0	100 −0	165 −0	180 −0	192
(0	153) (0	160) (0	171) (0	171) (0	171)
Good Health −0	238 −0	186 −0	242 −0	219 −0	236
(0	160) (0	169) (0	177) (0	176) (0	178)
Health Insurance 0	123 0	168 0	146 0	023
(0	144) (0	156) (0	152) (0	185)
Tot. Health Exp. 0	120 0	114 0	129
(0	084) (0	084) (0	082)
Pension (DC) −0	259 −0	232 −0	229
(0	126) (0	126) (0	125)
Pension (DB) 0	039 0	039 0	039
(0	117) (0	113) (0	118)
Fin. Wealth 0	789 0	786
(0	217) (0	208)
Health Ins (spouse) 0	195
(0	183)
(Continues)
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Table 2. Continued.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
τ 0	526 0	429 0	359 0	438 0	477 0	516 0	471
(0	399) (0	371) (0	349) (0	369) (0	256) (0	271) (0	269)
Function Value 0	470 0	758 0	699 0	296 1	347 1	116 1	030
Number of Obs. 1227 1227 1227 1214 1037 1037 1037
Note: Omitted categories are Non-Hisp.White, Less than high school, Midwest or OtherRegion, and
PoorHealth.
The threat point scale factor is 0	6, ρ= 0	004, and R= 10.
Table 3. HUSBANDS’ simultaneous duration.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
δ 1	052 1	064 1	072 1	066 1	037 1	039 1	045
(0	039) (0	042) (0	045) (0	040) (0	028) (0	029) (0	031)
θ1 1	169 1	218 1	216 1	218 1	201 1	228 1	206
(0	048) (0	064) (0	045) (0	059) (0	045) (0	052) (0	058)
≥62 yrs old 31	532 39	824 40	167 42	202 37	458 44	792 38	676
(11	356) (11	372) (12	557) (13	417) (9	673) (11	191) (10	818)
≥65 yrs old 25	696 29	254 29	757 32	379 31	744 35	036 30	981
(9	497) (11	229) (13	696) (8	307) (14	658) (9	954) (8	440)
constant −5	587 −5	449 −5	402 −5	627 −5	593 −5	734 −5	641
(0	231) (0	266) (0	279) (0	294) (0	302) (0	276) (0	311)
Age Diff. 0	021 0	025 0	026 0	030 0	024 0	025 0	025
(0	008) (0	007) (0	008) (0	008) (0	008) (0	008) (0	008)
Non-Hisp. Black −0	203 −0	203 −0	238 −0	272 −0	241 −0	262
(0	155) (0	158) (0	153) (0	168) (0	162) (0	162)
Other race −0	151 −0	174 −0	278 −0	129 −0	133 −0	131
(0	287) (0	285) (0	296) (0	298) (0	282) (0	284)
Hispanic −0	626 −0	625 −0	743 −0	475 −0	505 −0	487
(0	180) (0	180) (0	184) (0	183) (0	184) (0	183)
High school or GED −0	109 −0	083 −0	090 0	004 −0	040 −0	050
(0	118) (0	116) (0	121) (0	123) (0	122) (0	121)
Some college −0	357 −0	306 −0	299 −0	213 −0	266 −0	302
(0	133) (0	135) (0	137) (0	137) (0	139) (0	139)
College or above −0	522 −0	480 −0	456 −0	416 −0	495 −0	524
(0	128) (0	126) (0	132) (0	132) (0	136) (0	137)
NE 0	060 0	060 0	132 0	103 0	119 0	099
(0	122) (0	124) (0	126) (0	122) (0	123) (0	122)
SO −0	219 −0	210 −0	165 −0	156 −0	156 −0	140
(0	106) (0	105) (0	105) (0	109) (0	110) (0	110)
WE 0	066 0	060 0	050 0	011 0	010 0	011
(0	121) (0	122) (0	123) (0	124) (0	123) (0	122)
V Good Health −0	111 −0	140 −0	118 −0	125 −0	128
(0	132) (0	137) (0	143) (0	143) (0	142)
Good Health −0	071 −0	114 −0	069 −0	078 −0	090
(0	137) (0	140) (0	144) (0	143) (0	142)
(Continues)
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Table 3. Continued.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Health Insurance 0	243 0	117 0	135 0	039
(0	125) (0	134) (0	135) (0	167)
Tot. Health Exp. 0	112 0	103 0	121
(0	054) (0	053) (0	052)
Pension (DC) −0	104 −0	104 −0	093
(0	106) (0	104) (0	106)
Pension (DB) 0	288 0	293 0	305
(0	102) (0	102) (0	105)
Fin. Wealth 0	251 0	256
(0	188) (0	191)
Health Ins (spouse) 0	111
(0	174)
τ 0	526 0	429 0	359 0	438 0	477 0	516 0	471
(0	399) (0	371) (0	349) (0	369) (0	256) (0	271) (0	269)
Function Value 0	470 0	758 0	699 0	296 1	347 1	116 1	030
Number of Obs. 1227 1227 1227 1214 1037 1037 1037
Note: Omitted categories are Non-Hisp.White, Less than high school, Midwest or OtherRegion, and
PoorHealth.
The threat point scale factor is 0	6, ρ= 0	004, and R= 10.
60th year of the older partner, a larger age difference implies that the wife is younger at
time zero and less likely to retire at any “family age” than an older woman (i.e., a similar
wife in a household with a lower age difference). Both nonwhite men and women have
a lower retirement hazard than non-Hispanic whites.
Self-reported health lowers the hazard, with healthier people retiring later than those
in poor health. Having health insurance increases the hazard for both husbands and
wives, though not in a statistically significant way. Total health expenditures increase
the hazard for female and for males (being statistically significant for the latter). Having
a defined benefit pension plan increases the probability of retirement for both genders,
but it is numerically and statistically much stronger for men. A defined contribution
plan negatively affects the hazard for both, but here female effects are numerically and
statistically more pronounced than those for men. We believe this obtains as defined
benefit plans are perceived as providing a less risky retirement income stream compared
to defined contribution plans. Wealthier men and women tend to retire earlier and the
effect is particularly more pronounced for women. Spousal health insurance also leads
to earlier retirement though the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
The interaction parameter ranges from 1	04 to 1	07 across our specifications. In
terms of our model, this means that the utility flow of retirement increases by 3–7%
when one’s partner retires. In terms of the effect on the hazard rate of retirement, this
corresponds to between 11% and 12% of the effect of having a defined benefit plan for
men. We also note that the copula parameter hovers around 0	5 in many of our specifi-
cations, yielding a Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient of about 0	2. As explained pre-
viously, this correlation is potentially due to sorting or unobserved heterogeneity.
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To gauge the quantitative importance of the retirement externality, we also com-
puted the marginal effect of assigning every man to a defined contribution pension plan
compared to a defined benefit plan, holding everything else fixed.12 This resulted in a
14	4-month change in the median uncensored retirement date for men. The simulated
effect on the women was a change in the median uncensored retirement date of 0	88
month. In other words, the indirect effect on the women through the retirement exter-
nality is about 6	1% of the direct effect on the men. Given the large amount of censoring,
one might argue that the median uncensored retirement date is not representative of the
data we actually use. We therefore also compared the effect on the 25th percentile of un-
censored retirement dates. Here, the direct effect on the husbands was 2	4 months, while
the effect on the wives corresponded to about 16	5% of that.
We also added spousal variables as covariates to the sixth specification. Those vari-
ables were: dummies for “very good health” and “good health” and dummies for defined
benefit and defined contribution pensions. For males, none of the coefficients on the
spousal variables is statistically significant. For females, only the coefficient on a defined
benefit pension plan for the spouse is statistically significant. The coefficient of the hus-
band having a defined benefit plan on a woman’s duration (0	42) is larger than that of the
man himself having a defined benefit pension plan on his own duration to retirement,
which is 0	31 once we include the spousal covariates. In contrast, the point estimate of
the effect of a wife having a defined benefit pension plan on the man’s duration is neg-
ative but numerically small (−0	03) and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the
spouse having a defined contribution pension plan is positive for the wives and negative
for the husband, but noisily estimated in both cases. Spousal health is also statistically
insignificant for husbands and wives and is in line with previous findings in the litera-
ture (e.g., Coile (2004a)). The effect of switching husbands from a defined contribution
to a defined benefit plan is still in line with our previous results: median duration un-
til retirement for men increases by 14	6 months, whereas median time to retirement for
wives increases by 0	9 month, corresponding to 6	2% of the direct effect on husbands’
duration. The corresponding numbers for the 25th percentile are an effect of 2	0 months
for the males and 0	4 months for the females.
All of the estimation results presented here can be thought of as GMM results. Rather
than working with the same moment conditions for all specifications, we always work
with the moment conditions that come from the scores of the auxiliary model, which
makes the number of overidentifying restrictions one for all of the specifications. As a
specification test, we should therefore compare our minimized objective function to a
Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom (see Proposition 2 and the ensuing
discussion in Smith (1993)). The p-values associated with this test of overidentifying
restrictions range from 24% to 58%. The average p-value across the six specifications is
39%. This suggests that our specification provides a good fit to the moments implicitly
used in the estimation and have good predictive power on the retirement behavior of
couples. This is confirmed by comparing the Kaplan–Meier estimator of the observed
durations to durations simulated using the sixth specification from Tables 2 and 3. This
12We used 100 simulation draws per individual to generate predictions under each of these two scenarios.
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Figure 7. Predicted and actual distribution of retirement durations.
is reported in Figure 7. Figure 8 reports the same graphs after breaking the sample into
two, depending on whether the health status is very good.
As mentioned previously, we set Ai, i= 12, equal to 0	6 of the utility spouse i would
obtain without the utility externality from joint retirement. We also estimated δ for vari-
ous proportions of the utility one would get in case the partner were not to retire in the
third specification from Tables 2 and 3. The estimated δ’s for proportions of 0	2, 0	4, 0	6,
and 0	8 were 1	050, 1	062, 1	072, and 1	065, respectively.
We have also explored the possibility that some men may delay retirement until the
wife is eligible for Medicare. In doing so, we estimate a model that allows for a poten-
tial jump in Z at the time when the spouse turns 65 (using our third specification). For
the wives, the point estimate for this new jump was very small: 0	99 (s.e. 8	27). For the
husbands, the point estimate of the jump when the spouse turns 65 was 8	2 (s.e. 10	9).
Figure 8. Predicted and actual distribution of retirement durations conditional of health.
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Finally, to evaluate whether joint retirement is likely to be an outcome from a com-
mon shock, as opposed to the interaction between husband and wife, we compare the
time variation of our regressors across couples who retire simultaneously and couples
who retire sequentially. For the survey waves preceding retirement of any member in the
household, we look at the average proportional changes in financial assets and health
expenditures and average changes in self-reported health status, pension plans (defined
benefit and defined contribution), and health insurance. For all of these variables, cou-
ples retiring simultaneously displayed at least as much stability (if not more) in the sur-
vey waves preceding retirement as those retiring sequentially. For example, financial as-
sets for those who end up retiring simultaneously are much more stable than for cou-
ples who retire sequentially: the average relative change in financial wealth across sur-
vey waves preceding retirement is a factor of 4	847 for those who retire simultaneously
versus a factor of 10	850 for those who retire sequentially. Standard deviations were also
lower for those couples retiring simultaneously. The same pattern arises even when the
factor is deflated by the growth in the S&P500 stock market index. Furthermore, there is
no discernible statistical difference between the average change in financial assets from
survey wave to survey wave for these two groups. Consequently, it is unlikely that shocks
to financial wealth (and, for that matter, that shocks to any of the variables listed above)
explain the joint retirement decision in our sample.
4. Concluding remarks
We have presented a new duration model that nests the usual generalized accelerated
failure time model, but allows for joint termination of a group of spells in a way that is
consistent with an economic model of joint decision making. The econometric model
is based on a very simple economic model with Nash bargaining and it can generate
concurrent termination of spells with positive probability as well as interdependence
between the durations when they are not concurrent, even when the underlying unob-
servables are independent.
We illustrate the model to the retirement of husband and wife using data from the
Health and Retirement Study. The main empirical finding is that simultaneity seems
economically important. Since the econometric model is based on a simple economic
model, it is possible to interpret the estimates in terms of the underlying preferences.
In our preferred specification, the indirect utility associated with being retired increases
by approximately 5% if one’s spouse is already retired. By comparison, a defined benefit
pension plan increases indirect utility by 34%. The estimated model also predicts that
the marginal effect of a change in the husbands’ pension plan on wives’ retirement dates
is about 6–20% of the direct effect on the husbands’.
Appendix
A.1 Computation of Z˜
To simulate from the model, we need Z˜ defines by Z˜i(t)=
∫∞
t Zi(s)e
−ρs ds. The parame-
terization Z(t; (αγ) τ)=Z1(t;α)+∑k=12Z2(t;γk tk)= ta +∑k=12 γkF(t; tk) makes











where the upper incomplete gamma function is defined by Γ (αx)= ∫∞x sα−1e−s ds.13









(−2s2 + 4(τ+ 1)s+ 1− 2(1+ τ)2)e−ρs ds+ ∫ ∞
τ+1
e−ρs ds









(−2s2 + 4(τ+ 1)s+ 1− 2(1+ τ)2)e−ρs ds+ ∫ ∞
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(−2s2 + 4τs+ 1− 2(1− τ)2)e−ρs ds+ ∫ ∞
τ+1
e−ρs ds





All the integrals have the form
∫
sje−ρs ds where j is an integer. Hence they can all be
expressed in closed form.
A.2 Auxiliary model
Our auxiliary model is composed of four reduced-form models that are chosen to cap-
ture the features of the data that are our main concern: the duration until retirement for
each of the two spouses, the idea that some married couples choose to retire jointly, and
13This expression can be further manipulated by noting that if the random variable X is Gamma dis-
tributed with parameters α and β= 1.


















Γ (α+ 1)FΓ (α+11)(ρt)
which is useful since both Γ (·) and FΓ (·1)(·) are preprogrammed in many software packages.
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finally the idea that the retirement durations may exhibit correlation (conditionally on
the covariates) even when they are not equal. For the first two, we use a standard pro-
portional hazard model for each spouse with a Weibull baseline hazard and the usual
specification for the covariate function. For the third, we use an ordered logit model as
suggested by our paper Honoré and de Paula (2010). For the fourth feature, we exploit
the covariance in the residuals in regressions of the two retirement durations on all the
covariates of the model. We present the models in detail below.
A.2.1 Weibull proportional hazardmodel For each spouse i, the hazard for retirement
conditional on xi is assumed to be λi(t|xi)= αitαi−1 exp(x′iβi). The (log) density of retire-








(−Zi(t)exp(x′iβi))}= logαi + (αi − 1) log t + x′iβi − tαi exp(x′iβi)	





Letting cin = 1 if the observed retirement date for spouse i in household n is (right-)
















A.2.2 Ordered logit model pseudo MLE In the spirit of the estimation strategy sug-
gested in Honoré and de Paula (2010), we also use an ordered logit model as an auxiliary
model. Whereas the Weibull model will convey information on the timing of retirement,
this second auxiliary model will provide information on the pervasiveness of joint re-




1 if t1 > t2 + 1
2 if |t1 − t2| ≤ 1
3 if t2 > t1 + 1	
Incorrectly assuming an ordered logit model for yn yields









where Λ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution.








































γ = (γ′1			− γ0)′	
The explanatory variables in the different parts of the auxiliary model need not be
the same, and they need not coincide with the explanatory variables in the model to be
estimated. In the empirical section below, the covariates in the Weibull auxiliary models
are each spouses’s own values of the explanatory variables in the model of interest. We
use a constant only as an explanatory variable in the ordered logit model. This leaves the
number of overidentifying restrictions constant across specifications.
In the data and in the simulations, y is defined using the failure time (i.e., the min-
imum between censoring and retirement dates). Censored observations do not pose
problems when the other person in the household is uncensored and retires earlier,
since in that case we can determine that retirement happened sequentially. Whereas
we can always mark whether retirement was sequential or simultaneous in the simula-
tions, when censoring happens before the retirement of the uncensored partner or both
are censored, we cannot determine in the data whether retirement was sequential. Since
we use the failure time in both the data and the simulations, censoring introduces the
same degree of “noise” in the definition of y in the data and in the simulations.
A.2.3 Covariance in failure times To allow for correlation in the unobservable vari-
ables K1 and K2, we use copula functions. We augment our auxiliary models with the
covariance in failure times (including censored observations in both the data and the
simulation moments) to perform the estimation. Specifically, we match the covariance
between the residuals from a regression of (censored log) failure time on all covariates
for husband and wife. An alternative is to use the residuals from regressions on spouse-
specific variables and/or to define generalized residuals from a proportional hazard
model estimated by maximum likelihood. The reason why we did not choose those ap-
proaches is that the asymptotic distribution for the covariance would then depend on
nuisance parameters (i.e., the regression coefficients). This is not the case if we use the
same set of covariates for husband and wife and estimate the model by OLS. Our pro-
cedure is therefore asymptotically equivalent to matching the true errors from those re-
gressions (projections).












h xh ln(tih)) for i = 12 with tin representing
the failure time (earliest between retirement and censoring time) for partner i in couple
n, xn representing the covariates for couple n and uˆinr is defined analogously on the
simulated observations.
A.2.4 Failure probability at early retirement age In the United States, individuals can
claim Social Security benefits as soon as they turn 62 years old. Whereas this implies a
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penalty vis-à-vis the official retirement age,14 it is noticeable that many individuals elect
to retire as soon as they reach 62 years of age. (In our data, this is visible from the steep
increase in the CDF for the retirement year of husbands in Figure 6.) To accommodate
this possibility, we allow for a discontinuity in Z(·) at the early retirement age. To capture
this feature of the model, we employ the probability of retirement in the (closed) interval
between 1 month before and 6 months after turning 62. In the notation of an objective









age62in − 1≤ tin ≤ age62in + 6
}−ψi)2
where age62in is the age (in months and measured in family-time) at which individual i in
family n turns 62.
A.2.5 Overall auxiliary model The overall auxiliary model objective function is then
defined by the pseudo-log likelihood function
logLmen(α1β1)+ logLwomen(α2β2)+Q(γ)+ C(ρ)+ S(ψ)
and the moment conditions used for estimating the parameters of the structural model
are the first-order conditions for maximizing this.

















The (asymptotic) standard errors of the structural estimates are calculated using the
formulae in Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
A.3 Computational details
The sample moment conditions implied by the auxiliary model used for indirect infer-
ence in this paper are discontinuous functions of the structural parameters. We calculate
the minimizer of the corresponding GMM minimization problem as follows:
14The official retirement age was 65 years old for individuals born in 1937 or earlier, and for persons born
after that year, it gradually increases to 67 years old, which is the retirement age for those born in 1960 or
after.
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Table 4. The Effect of bandwidth on the reported standard errors.
Females
Bandwidth Median 0	01 0	02 0	03 0	04 0	05 0	06 0	07 0	08 0	09 0	10
δ 0	04 0	06 0	05 0	04 0	05 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	05 0	05
θ1 0	06 0	06 0	06 0	05 0	06 0	06 0	06 0	06 0	06 0	06 0	07
≥62 yrs old 10	76 8	03 11	21 10	38 11	46 11	72 11	29 11	13 10	34 9	67 9	40
≥65 yrs old 11	10 7	53 10	61 15	39 15	36 11	29 12	29 11	13 10	92 11	07 11	04
Constant 0	32 0	28 0	28 0	29 0	31 0	32 0	32 0	34 0	34 0	35 0	35
Age Diff. 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16
Non-Hisp. Black 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	15 0	16 0	15 0	16 0	16
Other race 0	34 0	30 0	31 0	33 0	34 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	34 0	35 0	35
Hispanic 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	20 0	19
H. Sch. or GED 0	16 0	15 0	16 0	16 0	15 0	15 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16
Some college 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17 0	17
College or above 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	20 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	19
NE 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15
SO 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	11 0	12 0	12 0	11 0	11
WE 0	15 0	16 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15
V Good Health 0	15 0	14 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15 0	15
Good Health 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16
τ 0	35 0	35 0	36 0	35 0	36 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35
Males
Bandwidth Median 0	01 0	02 0	03 0	04 0	05 0	06 0	07 0	08 0	09 0	10
δ 0	04 0	06 0	05 0	04 0	05 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	05 0	05
θ1 0	05 0	06 0	06 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	04 0	05 0	05 0	05
≥62 yrs old 12	56 11	82 21	60 16	92 16	85 15	39 12	05 12	19 12	62 12	49 12	12
≥65 yrs old 13	70 7	53 11	58 13	67 13	72 19	72 16	71 13	50 12	07 13	95 15	94
constant 0	28 0	28 0	30 0	26 0	27 0	26 0	26 0	28 0	29 0	29 0	29
Age Diff. 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	08 0	07 0	07
Non-Hisp. Black 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	15 0	15
Other race 0	29 0	32 0	30 0	29 0	29 0	28 0	28 0	28 0	29 0	28 0	28
Hispanic 0	18 0	18 0	17 0	19 0	19 0	19 0	18 0	18 0	18 0	18 0	18
H. Sch. or GED 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12
Some college 0	13 0	15 0	13 0	14 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	14 0	13
College or above 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13
NE 0	12 0	12 0	14 0	14 0	13 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12
SO 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11
WE 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12
V Good Health 0	13 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13 0	13
Good Health 0	14 0	14 0	15 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14
τ 0	35 0	35 0	36 0	35 0	36 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35 0	35
Note: This table presents the estimated standard errors using different step-sizes to calculate the numeric derivative.
The first column (Median) presents the median of the estimated standard error for each parameter.
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1. δ is parameterized as exp(δ˜)+1; θ1, θ2, τ, and the jumps in Z(·) are parameterized
as exp(θ˜1), exp(θ˜2), exp(˜τ), exp(α1), and exp(α2).
2. Weibull models are estimated separately for husbands and wives as part of the
auxiliary model. The estimates from this are the starting values for the θ’s and β’s. The
starting values for δ and τ are 1	08 and exp(−1). The starting values for the jumps are
exp(1) and exp(3	5) for females and males, respectively. The starting values for the ob-
jective functions for Specifications 1–6 range from 50	6 to 60	2.
3. The parameters are estimated by particle swarm using the built-in Matlab rou-
tine. The objective functions for Specifications 1–6 ranged from 0	27 to 1	64 after this.
4. The following loop of procedures was used until a loop produced a change in the
parameter estimate of less than 10−5. (The number of loops was restricted to be between
5 and 20.)
(a) particle swarm using the built-in Matlab routine
(b) Powell’s conjugate direction method
(c) downhill simplex using Matlab’s fminsearch routine
(d) pattern search using Matlab’s built-in routine
(e) particle swarm focusing on the jump-parameters using the build-in Matlab rou-
tine
5. Estimation of the asymptotic variance of the indirect inference estimator requires
estimation of the variance of the element in the moment condition as well as estimation
of the derivative of its expectation. The latter is calculated by a numeric derivative af-
ter increasing the number of simulation replications by a factor of 20. For the step-size
in the numeric derivative, we choose 0	010	02 	 	 	 0	090	1, and report the median of
the implied estimated standard errors. Table 4 reports the reported standard errors for
Specification 3 along with the standard errors associated with the different step-sizes.
Table 4 suggests that the reported standard errors are not too sensitive to the way we
choose the bandwidth. This is an important advantage of increasing the number of sim-
ulation draws in the estimation of the standard errors.
The discount factor is fixed and not estimated.
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